

FOREIGN REPORT
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Is Russia violating arms pacts

An important battle that will directly affect the future of America is being fought out behind the scenes of the Reagan administration, the Central Intelligence Agency and the state department.

Control and Disarmament Agency on the other – is about the unratified Salt-2 agreement, alleged Soviet violations of Salt-1 and other treaties, and the future of arms control in general.

The focal point of the clash is a long, highly-classified study being prepared by top officials at ACDA which claims that the Soviet Union has regularly violated treaties and is, therefore, not to be trusted. The issue is whether there is any point in signing any future agreements with the Russians if they are “contemptible cheaters”, as one ACDA source put it.

Traditionally, the CIA has taken the most benevolent view of Soviet actions which are “ambiguous” in relation to such treaties. The state department, under Alexander Haig, does not want to shut down any possibility of talking with the Russians in the future by trumpeting to the world treaty violations that may not actually be so – and may, in fact, be technically legal actions, or actions not covered by specific agreements between the two countries.

FOREIGN REPORT has been given the substance of an early draft of the ACDA report, which will include at least two dozen specific instances of what are called probable or clear Soviet violations.

These concerning the Salt-1 agreement, signed in 1972, include:

- ① Large-scale camouflage and concealment of testing, production and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (see FOREIGN REPORT, March 5, 1981).
- ② Deployment of up to 150 launch control silos (III-X silos), which might be converted for use as missile silos, and an increase in their depth, which means that they might hold the Russian super-missile, the SS-18.
- ③ Replacement of the SS-11 with a heavy missile.
- ④ Deactivation of fewer than the agreed number of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic

missiles) to make up for new replacements, and the concealing of the fact that the agreement had not been fully complied with.

- ⑤ Use of 18 SS-9 ICBM training launchers, maybe as part of the active ICBM force.
- ⑥ Encryption of telemetry – encoding, to make it unreadable, the stream of performance data coming from a test missile – for various missiles listed in the agreement.

Allegations about the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and protocol, signed in 1972, include:

- (1) Tests of an air-defence missile, the Sam-5, and its accompanying radar, the “Square Pair”, for ABM purposes – at least three times for both the interceptors and radar, but probably more often than that.
- (2) Development of a rapidly deployable ABM system called the ABM-X-3, using sophisticated phased-array radar.
- (3) Testing of Sam-10 radar in an ABM mode in 1979.
- (4) Falsification of the number of ABM test launchers deactivated in 1973.

The complaints concerning the unratified Salt-2 treaty, signed in 1979, include:

- ⑦ Misleading data on the range of the Backfire bomber, and statements which did not cover its known intercontinental and refuelling capability.
- ⑧ Heavy encryption of SS-18 tests, and the testing of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile for the Typhoon-class nuclear submarine.
- ⑨ The simulated testing of a rapid reload capability for the SS-18 during last September.